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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
14727

-vsPAUL KOYD HURLBURT,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
.~-

!

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction on the charve
of receiving stolen property valued at $100.00 or less.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR'l'
The case was heard before Edward Sheya, Judge'
of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Grand County,
sitting with a jury.

At the close of the State's case,

·~.:P'~w.1 ;,•;.~ J
. .;-,, ··.~

Ji

defendant moved to dismiss the action based upon
insufficient evidence.
to Dismiss.

Judge Sheya denied the Motion

After completion of the trial the jury

returned a verdict of guilty.

Defendant moved for a

new trial; the motion was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the verdict affirmed
and the rulings of the trial court upheld.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of
Facts except to exclude any reference to facts
alleged in the

Affidavit of Cydney Osanna.

The

affidavit was submitted to the trial court in support

of defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial.
The Osanna Affidavit contains facts not before the

trial court, and thus not considered by the jury in
reaching its verdict.

The motion for a new trial

was denied by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT APPELLANT
RECEIVED STOLEN PROPERTY KNOWING OR BELIEVING IT
PROBABLY HAD BEEN STOLEN, AND THUS THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE.
Appellant bases his appeal solely on the
failure of the trial court to grant defendant's
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the
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close of the State's case.

Appellant argues that the

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
one element of the offense of receiving stolen
property; namely, that he knew or believed that the
property had been stolen.
In ruling upon appellant's motion to dismiss
at the end of the State's case, the trial court found
that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
State from which the jury could find defendant guilty
of the offense of receiving stolen property.

The

court correctly noted that if there is sufficient
evidence to support a verdict of guilty, a motion
to dismiss at the end of the State's case must be
denied and any questions of fact resolved by the jury.
The statute under which appellant was
convicted is Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-408 Cl) '(Supp. 1975)

which provides as follows:
"A person commits theft if he
receives, retains, or disposes of
the property of another knowing that
it has been stolen, or believing
that it probably has been stolen, or
who conceals, sells, withholds, or
aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property from the owner,
knowing the property to be stolen,
with a purpose to deprive the owner
thereof."
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The jury in the instant case brought back a verdict
of guilty based upon a finding that the State
$Stablished each element of the offense of stolen
property, as Jury Instruction Number 2 required.
Appellant argues that the State failed to
'establish that he received, retained, or disposed
of.tl&e property of another "knowing that it has

been- stolen, or believing that it probably has been
9ttlill!IL.•

~

Instruction Number 2 informed the

j1ii:y tllRt it must

be convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that at the time defendant received, retained,
di:

di~

of the property of another he either

tftew the property had been stolen, or in the alternative, believed it probably had been stolen.

·.

As appellant correctly notes, the phrase
"believing it probably has been stolen" as set
forth in Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-408, withheld

constitutional attack in a recent Utah Supreme Court
case, State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah 1976).

The

Plum court found that the statute was sufficient to
inform those who would be law abiding of the conduct
expected of them.

The trial court in the Plum case

was careful to instruct the jury thateach element of
the crime of receiving stolen property must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Jury Instruction Number 2 in the instant
case complied with the requirement of Plum v. State,
supra.

The jury thus found beyond a reasonable

doubt that appellant either knew or believed that
the property probably had been stolen.

The jury

was not required to make a finding distinguishing
whether appellant had definitive knowledge that the
property had been stolen, or whether appellant believed
the property probably had been stolen.

The two

alternatives in the element of knowledge were
presented to the jury as a single material allegatioa
.·.'

in the offense of receiving stolen property.
Appellant reviews case law from Utah and
several other states to distinguish certain factors

.'t

present in receiving stolen property cases, particularly
those facts which were found pertinent on the questi(Pl
of knowledge.

After identifying common factors

found in receiving stolen property cases appellant
attempts to·argue that since those common factors
were not present in his case, the element of knowledge
has not been established.
For example, appellant points out that there
was a two month period of time between the date the
tool box was stolen and the date he pawned it, that
he was not in possession of the stolen tool box
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tbie two month period, that he used his own
'f&wnin9 the tool box and finally, that

llllllllilltlllild a logical, uncontroverted explanation
of the tool box.
true that the above factors
be relevant on the question of
cular receiving stolen property
held that any one or more
present to uphold a

'-ia tlefeadant either knew or believed
been stolen.
explain away the fact
the sheriff when
about his possession of the tool
United States v. May, 430
that a defendant's contradictory
give rise to the justifiable inference
was falsely made, satisfying

, ::tlie kn6iledge requirement of the federal statute

~

which the action was brought.
Further, in People v. Malouf, 135 Cal. App.

2d 697, 287 P.2d 834 (1955) the court found that

possession of stolen property, accompanied by
suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference

~·

r··

that property was received with knowledge that the
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property had been stolen.

Certainly appellant's

vague and contradictory statements as to his
possession of the tool box created a suspicious
circumstance that would justify the jury in findj,ag'
that appellant either knew or believed that the icf61}tJA.'-'.
box probably had been stolen.
correctly notes that mere possession-of stol.,J:li:
goods does not in and
of knowledge, the May and Malouf cases
that possession of stolen property

aCOellllffl~IJltcl. .

an evasive or contradictory explanation
possession may be sufficient to

had been stolen.
In Barnes v. United States, 93 S.ct..

u.s.

837, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) the jury wae.tMIUJ!lt

that:

"°

".
possession of recently sbeleir
property, if not safisfactorily ex: •.
plained, is ordinarily a cirowtst.imlle•"Ji;~_\.
from which you may reasonably draw
the inference and find, in the
~::id·
light of the surrounding circumstances.
shown by the evidence in the case,
~~
that the person in possession knew the
property had been stolen."
The United States Supreme Court upheld the above
jury instruction stating that the evidence established
that the petitioner possessed stolen property. In that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

stolen Treasury checks payable to persons
and the record, reflected
for his possession consistent
Justice Powell found that the
w' . . forth in the jury instruction satisfied
..

'"!-·

the instant case reflects

la.ill...

llllllrlff earl Davis questioned appellant
the tool box that had been
name at the Five C's pawn
woke up one morning
tools in his livingroom, that he had

~·his apartment the night before and one
friends might have left the tools there.
.

No

. . 4'tegplanation was given by appellant regarding

. ··~~ pessession of the tools.
At the time the Motion to Dismiss was made at the
close of the State's case, the trial court had heard
testimony establishing the fact of the theft of a tool
box, the fact that appellant had pawned the tool box
at the Five C's pawn shop, and a vague explanation
given by appellant to the Sheriff concerning appellant's

-8-
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possession of the tool box.

The Barnes, Malouf and

May cases certainly support the decision of the trial
court to deny appellant's motion to dismiss at the
end of the State's case; the State had established
possession of stolen property by appellant and a
vague explanation concerning his possession of the
tool box.

These factors were sufficient to peradt

a finding of guilty knowledge, thus requiring
trial court to deny appellant's motion to di11111:tallli~
The appellant then presented his case
of his own testimony.

The case went to

based upon the evidence, including testimony of.all
the witnesses, a verdict of guilty was returned.
CONCLUSION
Appellant presents a single point on apeeal ...
He argues that the court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's
case.

Based upon the above cited argument and

aut~ority, the trial court had sufficient evidence

before it to deny the motion to dismiss, continue
the course of the trial, and submit the case to the
jury.

The jury then weighed all the evidence and
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·<"""

lant guilty of the offense of receiving
knowing or believing it probably
Therefore, respondent requests

Respectfully submitted,

.. '"
'"

VERNOH B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
.Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
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